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Virtue in Positive Psychology 
 
Abstract 
1. Introductory Remarks 
 
This paper was inspired by Don Browning and Terry Cooper’s ‘Religious Thought and the 
Modern Psychologies’ (2004), a book that reveals, examines and evaluates the picture of the 
human person, images of human fulfilment and principles of ethical obligation implicit in a 
range of modern psychotherapeutic psychologies. In this essay, Browning and Cooper’s 
methodological approach will be extended to positive psychology, with special reference to 
Martin Seligman who is widely recognised as its founder. 
Building on Browning and Cooper’s foundational work (2004), it will be suggested that, akin 
to humanistic psychology, the principle of ethical obligation implicit within positive 
psychology is the non-hedonistic ethical egoism of bringing one’s unique set of potentials to 
realisation. Whereas the humanistic psychologists identified this as ‘self-actualisation’, 
Seligman refers to a person’s unique constellation of potentials as ‘signature strengths’, the 
practice of which leads to fulfilment. Positive psychology is characterised by humanistic 
psychology’s ‘culture of joy’, an image of the good life that consists in giving expression to 
and actualising the innate human potentials everyone has – with little thought devoted to the 
possibility of competing interests between individuals, or to addressing personal weaknesses 
which are taken to be ‘buffered’ by strengths (Seligman, 2003, p. 13). 
Alongside the ‘culture of joy’ of the humanistic psychologies, positive psychology seems also 
to incorporate elements of the ‘culture of calm reason’ which characterises the cognitive 
therapies (Browning & Cooper, 2004). Such ‘neo-Stoic’ therapies embody the idea that human 
reason can be educated to eradicate the anxiety and depression whose root cause is 
‘dysfunctional thinking’. As such, the final ground of optimism in Seligman’s ‘Learned 
Optimism’ (1992; 2006) is confidence based on the self’s ability to change and manipulate 
maladaptive beliefs. Hope (taken to be synonymous with optimism and other concepts allied 
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under the umbrella term ‘future-mindedness’) is therefore largely under our control, is 
fundamentally cognitive, and is amenable to conscious modification.  
Positive psychological research has been heavily influenced by cognitive psychology and its 
applied manifestation in cognitive therapies and cognitive behavioural therapies.As such, it is 
also freighted with the implicit vision of human fulfilment that Browning and Cooper (2004) 
discerned in the therapies of Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck and Murray Bowen, essentially the ‘Stoic, 
non-reactionary, almost imperturbable self’, able to exercise calm and reasoned control of 
emotional reactivity in the service of the self’s best interests. 
Seligman portrays human excellences as means to a largely hedonic end; a happier life. While 
he recognised that he had earlier placed too much emphasis on happiness as the goal of 
positive psychology, most of the empirical interventions he outlines in his more recent work 
(‘Flourish’, 2011) continue to use satisfaction with life or subjective wellbeing as dependent 
measures, suggesting measurements of happiness still play a principal role in his thinking. In 
both ‘Authentic Happiness’ and ‘Flourish’ Seligman seems to conceive of character strengths 
primarily as individual aptitudes that are promoted because they enable an individual to enter 
a state of flow; ‘you need to deploy your highest strengths and talents to meet the world in 
flow’ (Seligman, 2011, p. 11). In both the earlier and revised theories, strengths contribute to 
an aspect of wellbeing identified as ‘engagement’ (‘being one with the music…the loss of self-
consciousness during an absorbing activity’, 2011, p. 11).  
This understanding of character strengths is incomplete. There is more to the practice of 
virtues than their role in fostering an individual’s ‘engagement’ and ‘flow’. Second, the idea 
that people have diagnosable ‘signature strengths’ and need not be concerned with 
addressing deficiencies in other strengths depends a great deal on the strengths under 
consideration. Finally, the understanding of human excellences as individual aptitudes 
occludes the fact that many virtues are profoundly relational; they are conceived, practised 
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2. The ‘Vision of Positive Psychology’ 
 
Positive psychology not only aims to promote well-being and flourishing, Seligman also claims 
it offers a scientifically-grounded way of elucidating the good life and demonstrating what 
makes life worth living (Seligman, 1999, p. 562; Seligman 2011, p. 1-2). As such, it goes beyond 
science in extending notions of what constitutes human fulfilment. My emphasis will be on 
positive psychology as it is understood by Martin Seligman, who is widely credited as the 
field’s founder. Indeed, Seligman believed himself to be establishing a new field when he 
spoke of ‘Positive Psychology’ as one of the unique initiatives of his Presidency of the 
American Psychology Association (APA) in 1998.  
Seligman revised his views with the publication of ‘Flourish’ (2011). In his earlier work 
‘Authentic Happiness’ (2003), three elements (positive emotion, engagement and meaning) 
contributed to an individual’s happiness, operationalised as satisfaction with life. He later 
augmented these three elements of his earlier theory with two new components 
(accomplishment and positive relationships) and identified the goal of the new theory as 
increasing flourishing by increasing all five elements which each contribute to - but do not in 
themselves define - wellbeing (Seligman, 2011, p. 15). The mnemonic ‘PERMA’ was coined to 
reflect these five elements of wellbeing: Positive emotion, Engagement, positive 
Relationships, Meaning and Accomplishment.  
A common thread linking both Seligman’s earlier and later thinking, however, is the view that 
we choose our course in life by maximising our performance in each of the elements of the 
theory (Seligman, 2011, p. 25). Whereas in ‘Authentic Happiness’ we make our choices based 
on how much life satisfaction we estimate will result, PERMA (wellbeing) theory is more 
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complex insofar as our choices in each area of the five elements of wellbeing may conflict 
with one another, so that we cannot reduce flourishing to a single overarching variable.  
This is undeniably an important revision in Seligman’s understanding of the role Positive 
Psychology can play in promoting the good life, though the underlying similarities in the 
theories may be greater than their differences. Both theories presuppose that a scientifically-
grounded psychology can promote the goal of human flourishing (albeit differently 
conceived), and both suggest that a self-conscious cost-benefit calculation ensures we 
maximise well-being (whether that is construed narrowly as satisfaction with life, or more 
broadly across the five elements contributing to PERMA).  
Since its beginnings, Positive Psychology can be located within a tradition of 
psychotherapeutic psychologies which have aimed to improve the quality of human life in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century. These various psychological schools make different (often 
unacknowledged) assumptions about human nature, locate the cause of human suffering in 
distinctive struggles, and propose diverse ways of extending healing based on these 
‘diagnoses’. For example, a distinction can be drawn between those psychologies which see 
the human person as somehow divided against itself (Freudian theory springs to mind), and 
those psychologies that subscribe to a more essentialist view of the human person, wherein 
an individual may experience incongruence due to conflict between their innermost self and 
familial and societal pressures from without, but not because they are fundamentally divided 
against themselves. Humanistic psychologies tend to exhibit variations on this theme. 
The central thesis of both the original and revised editions of ‘Religious Thought and the 
Modern Psychologies’ (Browning & Cooper, 1987; 2004) is that modern psychotherapeutic 
psychologies should be viewed as disciplines that blend psychological insights with ethical and 
metaphysical assumptions. Browning and Cooper argue that it is impossible for psychologists 
embedded within different psychological schools, to avoid making assumptions about human 
nature and ethics while inhabiting the worldviews implicit within these psychologies. 
Following the legacy of Paul Tillich’s ‘theology of culture’ (Tillich, 1964), Browning and Cooper 
propose that beneath the scientific veneer, modern psychologies enclose hidden worldviews 
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of which proponents of these psychological schools may be unaware. Such a position could 
be deemed a step too far for many people, who could look upon this undertaking as an unfair 
foisting of ‘false consciousness’ onto a cultural product, be that psychotherapy, a film or an 
expressionist painting. This ‘hidden meaning’ could be denied outright by a poet, painter, 
philosopher, or indeed by a psychologist.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that cultural products contain embedded ideologies, 
worldviews (even quasi-religions) of which their originators may be unaware. Browning and 
Cooper (1987; 2004) analysed the discourse of a range of modern psychotherapeutic 
psychologies, revealing the implicit principles of ethical obligation, the image of the human 
person, and the nature of human fulfilment presupposed within these psychological schools. 
They encouraged others to follow them in examining and evaluating the implicit ‘functional 
religions’ of contemporary psychologies, and this paper takes up their invitation, applying a 
similar approach to Positive Psychology.  
 
3. Positive Psychology: Its Origins and Aims 
 
In 1998 Martin Seligman became President of the American Psychological Association (APA). 
His inaugural address focused on ‘Positive Psychology’ - a branch of psychology he was set 
to launch. He proposed that Positive Psychology would correct a psychology that had 
become almost completely preoccupied with treating pathology and argued that a 
concentration of research efforts on damage repair had neglected what was positive in the 
individual and how personal strengths could be promoted. 
In his early work Seligman conducted research on ‘learned helplessness’ in animals 
(Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967; Seligman & Beagley, 1975). Learned 
helplessness describes what happens when an animal is repeatedly subjected to an 
inescapable aversive stimulus (usually an electric shock). Eventually, the animal will stop 
trying to avoid the stimulus and behave as if it is utterly helpless to change the situation; it 
has ‘learned’ that nothing it can do will enable it to escape the shock.  
Seligman extended the animal model to examine the role of learned helplessness in 
depression (Seligman, 1975; Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), which was linked to the 
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concept of explanatory (or attributional) style. Explanatory styles describe characteristic 
patterns which explain how people attribute the causes of events in their lives, leading to 
either a positive (optimistic) outlook or a negative (pessimistic) one (Peterson & Seligman, 
1988; Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer et al, 1982).  
Through the concept of ‘explanatory style’, Seligman and others had begun to examine the 
possibility of a more positive turn in psychology long before Seligman’s inaugural APA 
address in 1998.  In this presidential speech, Seligman spoke of his desire to launch a new 
science of human strengths; ‘…what I call ‘Positive Psychology’, that is, a reoriented science 
that emphasizes the understanding and building of the most positive qualities of an 
individual: optimism, courage, work ethic, future-mindedness, interpersonal skill, the 
capacity for pleasure and insight, and social responsibility’ (Seligman, 1998, p. 559). 
Positive Psychology became, therefore, not merely a call for a reorientation of clinical 
practice away from what might be psychologically ‘wrong’ with people; it also brought with it 
a substantive change of research focus to include the psychological investigation of strengths 
and virtues.  
It should be noted, however, that in developing the focus on strengths, Seligman came 
to develop a unique understanding of the relationship between character strengths and 
virtues – a difference that may not reflect the way in which these concepts are used by 
philosophers, psychologists or even in ordinary language (Gulliford, Morgan & Jordan, under 
submission). There seems to be substantial overlap in the meaning and use of the terms 
‘character strength’ and ‘virtue’ in common parlance, yet Peterson and Seligman (2004) 
defined virtues as superordinate categories exemplified by subordinate ‘character strengths’.  
Peterson and Seligman (2004) identified six superordinate virtue categories: wisdom, 
courage, humanity, justice, transcendence and temperance, and proposed that these six 
virtues are operationalised through twenty-four subordinate character strengths. This 
understanding of character strengths as embodying ‘routes to the virtues’ is therefore rather 
specialised, and the current examination of virtue in Positive Psychology does not uphold a 




Seligman described his ‘mission’ in running for President as a desire ‘to partake in launching 
a science and a profession whose aim is the building of what makes life most worth living’ 
(Seligman, 1998, p. 562). Furthermore, in a later article Seligman and co-author Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi asserted that this science would articulate a ‘vision of the good life that is 
empirically sound’ while being ‘understandable and attractive’ (2000, p.5, my italics).  
In speaking of a ‘vision of the good life’, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi took a far from a 
value-free stand on the purpose and end of the new science they described. Yet they claimed 
to present two alternatives for their re-orientated science. Positive Psychology could either 
take the course of being a purely descriptive science in which research findings are 
summarised and presented in a manner that would be dispassionate about the desirability 
of implementing the findings, or it could become a prescriptive discipline akin to clinical 
psychology, in which the paths out of pathologies are not only described, but also held to be 
desirable (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p.12).  
All this said, Positive Psychology is quite clearly, and by the authors’ own admission, in the 
business of ‘prescribing’ what is good for people. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi predicted, 
‘…a psychology of positive human functioning will arise that achieves a scientific 
understanding and effective interventions to build thriving in individuals, families and 
communities’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 13). ‘Thriving’ is an unabashedly 
prescriptive concept. Seligman’s Presidential Address the previous year underscored this 
same aspiration; ‘We can show the world what actions lead to well-being, to positive 
individuals, to flourishing communities, and to a just society’ (1999, p. 560). 
It is interesting, at this juncture, to note former President George Miller’s inaugural lecture 
to the American Psychology Association (APA) in 1969, where he made two points of current 
relevance. First, Miller was aware that psychologies incorporate ideologies that may be 
pernicious to humanity’s view of itself. He was especially concerned with behaviourism’s 
overriding and dehumanising metaphors of control and mechanisation, foreshadowing 
Browning and Cooper’s later work in revealing the deep metaphors embedded in the 
conceptual systems of psychotherapeutic psychologies. Secondly, Miller’s address drew 
attention to the fact that psychology, at least under the guidance of the APA, is already a 
prescriptive science, committed to promoting human welfare, though he was far less certain 
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the role psychology as a discipline and the APA should play in promoting human welfare than 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi; ‘…we should keep clearly in mind that society has not 
commissioned us to cure its ills; a challenge is not a mandate’ (Miller, 1969, p. 1063).  
Similarly, Marie Jahoda an Austrian-British social psychologist while noting a one-sided 
development in psychological knowledge of malfunctioning (Jahoda, 1958), had also 
questioned whether it was possible for psychology to be a purely descriptive science. 
Definitions of mental health ‘…often contain implicit personal or general philosophies- they 
often specify how human beings ought to be’ (1958, p.4, my italics). She acknowledged that 
the principal subject matter of psychotherapeutic psychologies inevitably involves the 
intermingling of value and fact.  
But as Miller later cautioned, Jahoda warned against grandiose schemes where psychology 
is construed as providing a complete account of how positive mental health is to be fulfilled; 
‘The experts in the mental health field have no special right to usurp this weighty decision; 
politicians, humanists, natural scientists, philosophers, the man in the street, and the mental 
health expert must jointly shoulder this responsibility’ (Jahoda, 1958, p. 83). This contrasts 
sharply with Seligman’s later ambitions for Positive Psychology; ‘We can show the world 
what actions lead to well-being, to positive individuals, to flourishing communities, and to a 
just society’ (1999, p. 560). 
 
4. Strengths, Weaknesses and Flourishing 
Seligman describes the key moment to which he credits his reorientation to the positive, 
though a change in his thinking seems to have been in the air in his examination of ‘learned 
optimism’ (1990). He attributes his change of direction to an epiphany with his five-year old 
daughter who helped him realise he did not have to ‘correct’ behaviours but could focus 
instead on building strengths. It spawned the idea that if strengths could be nurtured they 
could ‘buffer’ individuals against weaknesses (Seligman, 2003, pp. 27- 29). 
Seligman’s approach to human strengths consisted of identifying, defining and classifying 
human excellences and developing means of measuring and promoting them. In September 
2000, the late Christopher Peterson was invited to be scientific director of the Values in 
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Action (VIA) Institute in Pennsylvania. For the next three years, Seligman and Peterson 
collaborated with international researchers to devise a classification of strengths based on 
their cross-cultural ubiquity. The result of this initiative was the VIA Classification of 
Strengths and Virtues, which since its beginnings in 2004 has been operationalised in self-
report scales, including the original VIA-IS and more recently the VIA-R, VIA-M and VIA-P 
(McGrath, 2017). 
Seligman used the twenty-four strengths of the VIA classification in the self-help book 
‘Authentic Happiness’ (2003) where he suggested that rather than correct weaknesses 
psychology should focus on building strengths (Seligman, 2003, p. 13). Whereas initially this 
proposal represented merely a different and neglected way of doing psychology, by the time 
he wrote ‘Authentic Happiness’, enacting personal strengths had assumed a causal role in 
the realization of ‘authentic happiness’; ‘Authentic happiness comes from identifying and 
cultivating your most fundamental strengths and using them in work, love, play and 
parenting’ (Seligman, 2003, p. xiii).  
Seligman’s stated aim in ‘Authentic Happiness’ was, ‘…measuring happiness’s constituents- 
the positive emotions and strengths - and then telling you what science has discovered about 
how you can increase them’ (Seligman, 2003, p. 16). Positive Psychology equips people to 
increase (‘maximise’) their level of happiness, which was described as ‘the goal of the whole 
positive psychology enterprise’ (Seligman, 2003, p. 262). Though Seligman later reappraised 
the measurement of happiness (understood as satisfaction with life) as the cornerstone of 
his thinking (Seligman, 2011), his conception of character strengths as primarily sources of 
engagement and flow did not change appreciably in his more recent work. The range of 
human excellences identified by the VIA classification, the exercise described to identify 
one’s ‘signature strengths’ and the rationale for identifying these ‘characteristic strengths’ 
appear unchanged in Seligman’s later work in ‘Flourish’ (Seligman, 2011, pp. 38-9). 
‘Signature strengths’ continue to be an important element of Positive Psychology by 




5. Growth and Self-Actualisation in Humanistic Psychologies and Positive Psychology 
 
There are clear parallels between humanistic psychologies and Positive Psychology insofar 
as both these schools of psychology emphasise growth, personal fulfilment and individual 
choice in realising one’s authentic self.  Humanistic psychology (also known as ‘third force’ 
psychology because of its ascendancy after the schools of psychoanalysis and behaviourism) 
brought concepts of growth, self-realisation and purpose into the remit of psychological 
discourse. 
In contrast to the passive, behaviourist conceptualisation of the human person, humanistic 
psychologists put forward the view that human beings actively strive to realise inner 
potentialities. Jung paved the way for this with his concept of ‘individuation’, while Rogers 
suggested that people exhibit a fundamental motivation towards growth which he called the 
‘actualising tendency’ (Rogers, 1961). Humanistic psychologies such as those of Abraham 
Maslow and Fritz Perls, emphasised how an individual’s unique choices help or hinder their 
path to self-actualisation, in stark contrast to a behaviourism which sought to discover 
universal determinants of human behaviour. Behaviourism implicitly promoted a 
disempowering and incomplete understanding of the human person as essentially a 
stimulus-response ‘machine’. 
Though the self-actualisation that lies at the heart of humanistic psychologies may offer a 
more palatable and complex picture of the human person than the image portrayed by 
behaviourism, self-actualisation is far from an unproblematic concept. One thorny issue is 
the question of how individual courses of self-actualisation pursued by different persons can 
ultimately harmonise with one another. How can it be that my self-actualisation can never 
conflict with another person’s, particularly among closely affiliated individuals? What 
underlying beliefs must be inherent within the worldview of humanistic psychology for self-
actualisation to be pursuable by individuals without conflicting with other people’s 
trajectories of fulfilment? 
Browning and Cooper (2004) characterised humanistic psychology as exhibiting a ‘culture of 
joy’, ‘…an image of the good life that sees it consisting primarily of a rather uncomplicated 
matter of giving expression to and actualising the innate human potentials that everyone 
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has. These potentials are seen primarily as positive, benign, creative, and socially 
constructive. Through a simple process of discovering one’s own potentials and expressing 
them, individual fulfilment can be experienced and social harmony achieved (Browning & 
Cooper, 2004, p.61). They contend that belief in some sort of ‘preestablished harmony’ is a 
necessary ideological pre-requisite of the worldview of humanistic psychology, for unless 
there is an existing though perhaps indiscernible harmony within the world, the notion that 
individuals should follow their own trajectory of self-actualization is problematic as these 
courses could potentially compete with one another. To avoid this contradiction, an at least 
implicit belief in the ultimate compatibility of all trajectories, by a kind of ‘invisible hand’ is 
presupposed. 
The notion of self-actualisation, central to the humanistic psychologies is also present in 
Positive Psychology through the enacting of what are described as one’s ‘signature 
strengths’. David’s Norton’s (1976) philosophical examination of the ethic of self-
actualisation considers the concept of eudaimonia – a notion to which Seligman also appeals 
(Seligman, 2003, pp. 112, 2901). According to Norton’s individualistic reading of the Greek 
concept, a life well-lived consists not in the hedonistic ethical egoism of pursuing pleasure, 
but in the non-hedonistic ethical egoism of ‘bringing forth or leading out (eudaimonia) one’s 
unique set of potentials- one’s daimon’ (Browning & Cooper, 2004, p. 70).2  
These potentialities can be brought to fruition or suppressed but cannot be changed. In a 
manner redolent of Seligman’s inattention to personal weaknesses, Norton’s analysis 
maintains that there is ‘…no need to suppress or repress errant or recalcitrant aspects of 
human nature. One need only remain loyal to the telos of one’s own daimon- one’s own 
unique set of innate, biologically grounded potentialities’ (Norton, 1976, cited in Browning 
& Cooper, 2004, p.70). 
                                                          
1 In this footnote, Seligman cites Carol Ryff’s description of well-being as ‘the striving for perfection that 
represents the realization of one’s true potential’ [Ryff (1995). Psychological wellbeing in adult life. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 99 -104.] 
2 Norton is well known as one of the best Hume scholars. His book Personal Destinies is thoroughly 
philosophical. His acknowledgment of the dynamic aspects of the Aristotelian proposal, i.e. happiness as an 
activity (cf. Nic. Ethics, 1095b-1101a, 1168a13-15) neglects the social aspects of the Greek framework (cf. 
Plato, Republic, passim and Arisotle, Politics book 1) that implies human fragility and vices. 
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On this reading, Seligman’s Positive Psychology seems to have at least one foot in the 
humanistic psychology camp. For instance, self-report scales based on Peterson and 
Seligman’ s VIA classification are used to ‘diagnose’ strengths that could be regarded as 
formerly immanent potentialities (Seligman, 2003, chapter 9; Seligman 2011, pp. 38-39). 
According to Seligman, some of these strengths are deeply characteristic of an individual 
whereas others are not. He calls the former a person’s ‘signature strengths’ and 
distinguishes them from weaker potentialities. He also believes that signature strengths 
‘buffer’ against personal weaknesses (though the mechanism for this is unclear).  
Consequently, Seligman believes that an individual need not ‘devote overly much effort to 
correcting weaknesses…the highest success in living and the deepest emotional satisfaction 
comes from building and using your signature strengths’ (Seligman, 2003, p.13). 
Let us suppose that a person who has taken one of the VIA questionnaires exhibits the top 
five strengths of creativity, love of learning, persistence, prudence and leadership. In 
deciding whether these top strengths represent ‘signature strengths’, Seligman offers nine 
criteria. An identified ‘top strength’ is deemed to be a ‘signature strength’ if at least one of 
these criteria applies to each top strength: 
• A sense of ownership and authenticity (‘This is the real me’) 
• A feeling of excitement while displaying it, particularly at first 
• A rapid learning curve as the strength is first practiced 
• Continuous learning of new ways to enact the strength3 
• A sense of yearning to find ways to use it 
• A feeling of the inevitability of the strength (‘Try and stop me’) 
• Invigoration rather than exhaustion while using the strength 
• The creation and pursuit of personal projects that revolve around it 
• Joy, zest, enthusiasm, and even ecstasy while using it (see Seligman, 2003, p. 160; 
Seligman 2011, pp. 38-9) 
 
The ‘profile’ of top strengths of creativity, love of learning, persistence, prudence and 
                                                          
3 This criterion is missing from the list in ‘Flourish’ (2011) 
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leadership matches these criteria well. For instance, someone who loves learning will 
probably find that all nine criteria are met for this strength. However, an individual is unlikely 
to feel ‘excitement’, ‘joy, and ‘enthusiasm’ in displaying prudence, or a sense of ‘yearning to 
find ways to use it’. It is doubtful whether a person would be ‘invigorated’ by acting with 
prudence. On the whole, however, the criteria seem applicable to those five strengths – and 
in any case a minimum of one criterion is sufficient to identify a top-scoring strength as a 
‘signature strength’. 
If, on the other hand, we imagine another individual whose ‘top strengths’ are love, kindness, 
forgiveness and mercy, humility and modesty, and fairness, the criteria seem less fitting. 
While Seligman describes all strengths (as opposed to talents) as ‘moral traits’ (Seligman 
2003, p.134), there is a difference between strengths that primarily concern our individual 
aptitudes (having a taste or flair for learning or creativity) and those strengths that are 
necessarily evinced in relationships with others, such as forgiveness and fairness.  
We might also deem strengths that have been acquired, perhaps at great personal effort, as 
more admirable than those which are innate (Zagzebski, 2015), and we may find there to be 
something deficient (even contemptible) about individuals who fail to develop acquired 
strengths like kindness to a sufficient degree (Zagzebski, 2015). Simply put, there are different 
types of human excellences in the VIA and these do not seem to occupy the same moral 
standing. 
The criteria Seligman supplies to identify a top-scoring strength as a ‘signature strength’ 
demonstrate a bias towards strengths conceived as individual aptitudes rather than 
interpersonal moral excellences like the capacity to forgive, be kind or show mercy. It seems 
highly unlikely that an individual could ever feel ‘excitement’ at their capacity to forgive, to 
‘yearn to find new ways’ of using this strength, to feel ‘invigorated’ by it, to create ‘personal 
projects that revolve around it’, or to feel ‘joy, zest or enthusiasm’ while practising it. 
Although it is conceivable that forgiveness might become easier over time (depending on the 
nature of the interpersonal offence being forgiven) there could never be a ‘rapid learning 
curve as the strength is first practised’ because cases where forgiveness might be deemed 
appropriate would be so different from each other in terms of their level of difficulty. Possibly 
the only criterion that may be applicable in this case is the first: ‘a sense of ownership and 
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authenticity when using the strength’ - if forgiveness were already central to a person’s moral 
identity. But even if we admit this point, there seems to be something misguided about 
conceiving the virtue of forgiveness as a capacity that is somehow ‘owned’. 
The strengths of the VIA classification encompass a range of types, raising the question of 
how varied a range of ‘signature strengths’ a person needs to function adequately both 
morally and in attaining non-moral goals. It also leaves open the question of how different 
individuals’ signature strength ‘profiles’ can be reconciled with each other.  
It could be argued that it is perhaps not an individual’s own strengths that buffer his or her 
weaknesses, (Seligman, 2003, pp. 27-29), but the strengths of others that fulfil this end. 
People whose strengths lie in pro-social domains may ultimately ‘buffer’ those lacking in these 
virtues. Whether an individual’s strengths compensate for defects is an empirical question 
and surely depends on the strengths in question and on the particulars of a given situation. 
Seligman’s understanding of ‘signature strengths’ seems to implicitly subscribe to the belief 
that individual trajectories of self-realisation somehow ‘complement’ one other – a key 
characteristic of humanistic psychologies as revealed by Browning and Cooper’s earlier 
analysis. Seligman does not speak of a daimon, but he does invoke the concept of eudaimonia, 
believing that the regular use of one’s signature strengths brings ‘gratification’, a state he 
identifies with it (Seligman, 2003, p. 112). While there may be more to a life that inheres in 
bringing one’s potentialities to full realization than in the pursuit of pleasure, it shares with 
humanistic psychology a lack of interest in the moral norms of either reciprocity or mutuality; 
if an individual’s ethical obligation inheres in following their inner daimon, and that is 
universalized, then there need be no concern with - nor investment in -  the drawing out of 
anyone else’s potentialities. 
Though Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi spoke of Positive Psychology in collectivist terms as 
the ‘scientific study of optimal human functioning [that] aims to discover and promote the 
factors that allow individuals and communities to thrive’ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, 
p. 5), questions of social harmony are clearly secondary to an individual’s enacting of the 
personal strengths that lead to their fulfilment. Seligman appears to envisage no potential 
conflict among constellations of signature strengths and must also - at least implicitly - 
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subscribe to a worldview in which any apparent conflict is transcended. Thus, it can be 
argued that Positive Psychology espouses the monistic view of the world that Browning and 
Cooper (2004) ascribe to the humanistic psychologists, in which we encounter ‘metaphysical 
metaphors…that are used to paint an image of the world whose apparently independent 
parts are so interrelated, interdependent, and harmonious that they are all identified with 
one another and identical with the divine itself’ (Browning & Cooper, 2004, p. 74-5).  
Such a belief is not derived from scientific study but represents a kind of faith in an ultimate 
harmony that is taken to be the natural consequence of individuals realising their authentic 
selves by ‘living out’ their own unique set of potentialities. Though self-actualization is not a 
term Seligman uses, perhaps precisely because of its coinage in a humanistic psychology 
from which he explicitly distanced himself (Seligman, 1998, p. 562), the task it describes is 
conveyed through the concept of ‘signature strengths’ which are offered as means by which 
individuals can attain authentic happiness and flourishing. 
The belief that the cultivation of these special strengths ‘buffer’ against personal weaknesses 
is problematic for various reasons. At no point are mechanisms advanced to explain how 
strengths in one domain might compensate for another; this seems to be asserted as a 
matter of “faith”. Second, and as previously noted, it is not clear why one should not be 
concerned to correct at least some personal deficiencies (pace Seligman, 2003, p. 13), 
depending on where those shortcomings lie. 
The view that everything will finally come out right if people are left to follow their own 
trajectories of fulfilment was criticized by Browning and Cooper (2004), who demonstrated 
that it is a pervasive and pernicious myth of most - if not all - humanistic psychologies. There 
can be no ‘universal harmony’ assumed to evolve from individuals pursuing their own self- 
interest. Much as we might like to believe that different courses of human fulfilment will 
ultimately harmonize with each other, this is not the hallmark of scientific thinking and 
instead represents a kind of ‘faith’. On this basis, there seems to be a profound ideological 
overlap between Positive Psychology and humanistic psychologies. 
However, to characterise Positive Psychology as simply ‘humanistic psychology redux’ would 
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be too simplistic despite the resemblances they clearly share. For alongside the influence of 
humanistic psychologies, the unmistakable impact of the cognitive therapies on Positive 
Psychology can also be discerned. This influence is not surprising, given Martin Seligman’s 
huge contributions to applied cognitive psychology in the decades before Positive 
Psychology was launched. 
 
6. Seligman the Stoic? 
Positive psychological literature has been clearly influenced by the cognitive therapies which 
can be grouped together insofar as these theories share the underlying belief that human 
reason can be educated to eradicate anxiety and depression which ultimately stem from 
faulty or dysfunctional thinking. This impact is most evident in the twin concepts of 
optimistic and pessimistic explanatory styles, popularised in ‘Learned Optimism’ (Seligman, 
1990; 2006), though the influence of cognitive therapies on Seligman’s understanding of 
other human strengths is also evident. 
Browning and Cooper (2004) chose to address three key figures in the field of cognitive 
therapy together, while Jones and Butman (1991) dealt separately with Albert Ellis (the 
originator of Rational Emotive Therapy - RET), Aaron Beck (who coined Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy) and Murray Bowen (the initiator of Family Systems Therapy). Though there are 
clearly differences between these therapeutic approaches (not least the emphasis on family 
dynamics in the latter), they overlap significantly in identifying emotional reactivity as the 
primary cause of mental distress, and human reason as its cure. These theories might 
reasonably be identified as neo-Stoic after the Greek philosophical school which arose in the 
third century BCE and which elevated reason as a means of rising above the grip of passions. 
In fact, Albert Ellis explicitly quoted the Stoic, Epictetus, in discussing the theory behind RET; 
‘Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them’ (Ellis, 1978, 
cited in Jones and Butman, 1991, p. 173). Human emotions are caused by our interpretations 
of events, which are therefore amenable to revision and reinterpretation. Emotional 
disturbances whose origins lie in distorted thinking can be reworked. A client comes to see 
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the ‘activating experiences’ (A) that have given rise to their beliefs (B), and the associated 
emotional consequences (C), through a process of disputing these irrational beliefs (D) 
under a therapist’s supervision. The letters ABCD are used to sum up a process which 
Seligman adapted in Learned Optimism (2006).4 
In the case of explanatory styles, pessimistic explanatory style is maintained by a 
characteristic pattern wherein individuals attribute the causes of failure internally (i.e. to 
themselves, rather than externally to others or circumstances), believe that failure is 
permanent (as opposed to impermanent) and suffuses all domains of their lives (is global or 
pervasive, rather than domain-specific). This can be contrasted with optimistic explanatory 
style (or ‘Learned Optimism’), which is characterised by the opposite pattern of external, 
impermanent and specific attributions for say, failing an exam.  By taking a dispassionate 
step back from one’s own thought patterns, explanatory style can be changed and a person 
can self-consciously take control of the way they systematically locate the causes of success 
and failure in their lives.  
Optimistic explanatory style or ‘learned optimism’ is therefore grounded in confidence in 
one’s ability to manipulate ‘dysfunctional’ beliefs, substituting them for more serviceable 
patterns of thought in the future. The final ground of ‘learned optimism’ lies in an individual’s 
cognitive resources and the self’s ability to change and manipulate the dysfunctional beliefs 
that sustain depressogenic thinking and anxiety. People seeking to develop a more optimistic 
outlook are assumed to be able to exercise choices over life, and to be in a position to control 
favourable outcomes to a significant degree.  
Ellis and Seligman share the belief that humans are basically happiness-seeking individuals, 
though neither are short-term hedonists; ‘Seek pleasures and happiness today – and also 
tomorrow! Do cost-benefit calculation to determine if your gains, now and in the future, are 
too costly’ (Ellis,1988, p. 34).  Seligman also favours a maximisation model, as we saw earlier, 
and advocates the same pragmatism Jones and Butman (1991, p.190) identified as one of 
two criteria guiding RET; the empirical and the pragmatic. What is taken to be a ‘rational’ 
                                                          
4 (A- adversity, B- beliefs and C- consequences, D- disputation and E - energization) 
18 
 
belief is determined according to empirical evidence (a criterion Seligman also prizes), and 
is further established on the basis of whether a belief serves in individual well and 
contributes to the goal of happiness. This second criterion is very much in evidence in 
Seligman’s thinking about Optimistic Explanatory Style; ‘…the question to ask yourself is not 
‘Is the belief true?’ but ‘Is it functional for me to think it right now?’ (Seligman, 2006, p. 223, 
my italics). 
It seems likely that Seligman was also influenced by other leading figures in the cognitive 
therapies, such as Aaron Beck whose approach was nested within broader, evolutionary 
perspective. Beck believed that human beings had evolved to overreact to threats to 
survival, leading to hypervigilance and a disproportionate concern with safety. Distinguishing 
between friends or foes, while essential for survival, led to sweeping generalisations and 
polarised categories of thinking that gave rise to increased emotional reactivity. 
Though Beck ‘normalised’ the human tendency towards dysfunctional thinking within 
evolutionary perspective, he offered the same cure as his predecessor, Albert Ellis.  
Essentially, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) foregrounds ‘cerebral control as the 
cornerstone of an effective life’ (Jones & Butman, 1991, p. 230). Its credo is that our affective 
life can be greatly improved by recognising (and changing) the distorted thinking that gives 
rise to emotional disturbance. 
Seligman’s work on optimistic and pessimistic explanatory styles, stemming from his earlier 
research on learned helplessness, stands within the cognitive tradition and shares its legacy 
of foregrounding the primacy of beliefs in sustaining emotions and influencing actions. It 
privileges an individual’s reason and will, and could be criticised for promoting the view that 
ultimately our problems are down to how we interpret the world. While this is clearly 
important, social factors also impact our well-being. The same criticism could be levelled at 
the Stoics, who rose to prominence in uncertain political times and who retreated to the 
(controllable) world within. 
Seligman’s work on optimistic explanatory style emphasises personal control and the 
functionality of beliefs. As such, it is also freighted with the implicit vision of human 
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fulfilment that Browning and Cooper (2004) discerned in the cognitive therapy of Ellis, Beck 
and Bowen, essentially the ‘Stoic, non-reactionary, almost imperturbable self’ able to 
exercise calm and reasoned control of emotional reactivity (Browning & Cooper, 2004, p. 
217).  
Seligman’s Positive Psychology seems, therefore, to blend elements of the humanistic and 
cognitive psychologies. It advocates an instrumentalist view of character strengths and 
virtues wherein an individual’s characteristic ‘signature strengths’ enable them to enter 
‘flow’ and attain meaningful ‘engagement’ with the world. In addition to the role ‘signature 
strengths’ play in living an ‘engaged life’, character strengths like hope and optimism, 
forgiveness and gratitude can be capitalised upon to increase positive affect and restrain the 
negative reactivity that threatens our attainment of happiness, as the next section will show. 
 
7. An evaluation of some virtues 
7.1. Hope 
Virtues in Positive Psychology tend to have been conceived as inner resources (personal 
strengths), yet there is a collective dimension to many virtues, which are sustained in 
participation with other agents. Positive psychological models of the ‘omnibus concept’ of 
‘hope/optimism/future-mindedness’ (Seligman, 2011, p. 260) tend to foreground its 
autonomous, self-directed aspects (the ability to exercise control over characteristic 
patterns of thinking that may be antithetical to hope), rather than those aspects of hope 
that may be kindled by other people. 
Optimistic explanatory style or ‘learned optimism’ is grounded in confidence in one’s ability 
to manipulate ‘dysfunctional’ beliefs, substituting them for more serviceable patterns of 
thought. The final ground of optimism about the future therefore lies in an individual’s 
internal, cognitive resources. On the other hand, hope (and courage – and perhaps many 
other virtues) may be kindled by confidence understood as trust. This cannot be adequately 
categorised as a ‘personal strength’ but rather an ‘interpersonal one’; hope exists between 
individuals. 
Hope has dependent as well as autonomous aspects since it is often sustained in relation to 
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other people. We know from our own experience that the expectations of significant others 
influence our own hope, for good or ill. This collective dimension of hope was emphasized 
in an older psychoanalytic literature that cognitive theories of ‘future-mindedness’ would do 
well to consider. Psychotherapist William Lynch argued that at the end-point of inward 
resource a person’s recovery lies in escaping a solipsistic world by daring to trust the vision 
of another person – often, though not necessarily- their therapist (Lynch, 1974, p. 77). When 
we become hopeless we may be beyond self-help, unable to buoy up sufficient enthusiasm 
to rework our patterns of thinking but – importantly – we are not beyond help; trust in others 
may kindle our hopes where our own efforts have run aground. 
Arthur Kobler and Ezra Stotland’s (1964) study of a suicide epidemic in an American 
psychiatric hospital in the 1960s demonstrated that expectations of significant others in the 
therapeutic environment were crucial in whether a patient could discern a way out of 
distress or interpreted their situation as hopeless, leading to their eventual suicide; ‘…suicide 
occurred in each case when, and only when, all significant and hopeful relationships were 
broken. The patient, after communicating, testing, and searching for hope, then felt that he 
was alone in an empty world’ (Kobler & Stotland, 1964, p. 260). 
I do not doubt that it is beneficial to take control of one’s own thinking, mindful that we may 
not be helping ourselves if we fail to see how habitual patterns of thought can unseat us. 
However, there is more to hope than an individual exercise in cognitive reappraisal. 
Moreover, we may not be able to bring about all that we hope for through our own 
interpretative efforts no matter how hard we might try! 
7.2. Forgiveness 
In the earlier discussion, it was remarked that the criteria Seligman outlines to identify an 
individual’s ‘Signature Strengths’ do not seem to fit forgiveness very well and seem to be 
biased towards describing individual aptitudes, such as love of learning and leadership rather 
than moral excellences like forgiveness, bravery and kindness. Given that forgiveness only 
comes into play in the wake of interpersonal offences and may not be appropriate in all 
circumstances, it is highly unlikely anyone would feel excited or invigorated by it, nor would 
they create personal projects that revolve around deploying it, actively seeking out new ways 
to use it. 
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Alongside this odd casting of forgiveness as a potential ‘Signature Strength’, Seligman also 
emphasises the role of forgiveness in effecting emotional regulation. Forgiveness, is 
advocated as a means of attenuating negative emotions in the person seeking to forgive; ‘My 
aim is merely to expose the inverse relationship between unforgiveness and life-satisfaction’ 
(Seligman, 2003, p. 77). He later describes forgiveness as a ‘…powerful tool that can transform 
feelings of anger and bitterness into neutrality, or even, for some, into positive emotions’ 
(Seligman, 2011, p. 41). While forgiveness may have this effect, this represents a limited view 
of forgiveness which grounds its value in its salutary benefits, and which bears the hallmarks 
of the cognitive therapeutic tendency towards absorbing negative emotional reactivity. 
People are motivated to forgive for reasons other than their own mental hygiene, though this 
is also a legitimate reason to forgive. We may seek to forgive for the benefit of the person 
who has wronged us, recognising that part of what it means to share the human condition is 
to make mistakes that cannot be undone; the philosopher Hannah Arendt (1958) called this 
the ‘condition of irreversibility’. If the goal of forgiveness becomes ‘hydraulic’ (to increase 
positive and decrease negative affect), it runs the risk of being conceived as something that 
is primarily ‘dispensed’ to others when they wrong us. This represents only half of what 
forgiveness means, for as human beings we share in the need to receive forgiveness for the 
inevitable mistakes we also make. 
Clearly, there are degrees of evil and some violations may finally lie outside the scope of 
human forgiveness. Nonetheless, there is a danger that the more we cast forgiveness in 
terms of forgiving other people, the more real the possibility becomes that we forget to see 
how much we might need to receive forgiveness ourselves. 
It is also debatable whether forgiveness is adequately characterised as an enduring 
‘signature’ strength, for much depends on the circumstances of any given case.  Is 
forgiveness always a virtue? While religious beliefs may incline some people to affirm that 
it is, others may provide good reasons to be ambivalent about its status as a strength of 
character or virtue (Gulliford, 2018, p. 245 – 248). 
As with hope, there are collective dimensions of forgiveness, too. There is more to 
forgiveness than reworking our attributions of blame to loosen the grip of negative 
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emotions, though this is not to say this is not a helpful and effective exercise. We learn about 
forgiveness in relationship with others; receiving forgiveness from others creates the 
example required to potentiate our forgiving other people. While this may resonate with 
readers familiar with the New Testament, it is surely a supremely developmental point; no 
one learns to forgive without first being forgiven. 
 
7.4. Gratitude 
As was the case with forgiveness, Seligman emphasises the role of gratitude in maximising 
well-being. He presents gratitude as a means of capitalising on positive events and advocates 
keeping a gratitude journal as a way of increasing satisfaction with life (Seligman, 2003, p. 
75). The ‘gratitude visit’ Seligman describes in Authentic Happiness has become one of the 
most successful ‘positive interventions’, reliably increasing subjective well-being and 
lowering depression in experimental participants relative to controls, for up to a month post-
intervention (Park, Peterson, Seligman & Steen, 2005). 
In much the same way as Seligman’s focus in forgiveness is the person forgiving, in his 
consideration of gratitude he foregrounds the person giving thanks (the beneficiary). Again, 
there is much more to gratitude than its salutary benefits; people are unlikely to be 
persuaded to develop gratitude simply because it is good for their wellbeing, even if this may 
be a fortunate side effect. People are moved to be grateful to benefactors because they wish 
to acknowledge and honour their kindness, setting up a virtuous cycle wherein generosity 
and gratitude are mutually reinforcing and grow in relationship with other people.  
If we establish the value of gratitude in our own subjective wellbeing or life satisfaction we 
are only seeing a part of the bigger social picture; the way in which gratitude sustains our 
lives and highlights our connectedness to other people. This is not to undermine the 
important role gratitude interventions such as journaling could play in combating low mood, 
especially in clinical populations, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that gratitude 
helps build social bonds and makes people feel valued. 
Gratitude, forgiveness and hope are complex human virtues that effect far more than 
emotional regulation and repair, yet the cognitive therapeutic framework from which 
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Seligman draws, foregrounds the tendency to see these character strengths in terms of their 
ability to rein in emotional reactivity, minimising negative and increasing positive affect.  
Similarly, the motivations for being forgiving, grateful or hopeful are grounded in maximising 
or capitalising on positive outcomes for individual wellbeing, a theme running through both 
‘Authentic Happiness’ (2003) and ‘Flourish’ (2011). 
While the humanistic and cognitive therapies that have influenced Positive Psychology are 
different in fundamental respects, both are individualistic. The humanistic process of self-
actualisation describes a personal odyssey. Similarly, cognitive therapies focus on an 
individual’s faulty interpretation of the world which can be transcended by means of their 
own rational capacities. 
The influence of both these psychological schools on Positive Psychology perhaps inevitably 
puts individual dimensions of human strengths and virtues in the foreground, while their 
collective aspects are relegated to the shadows. To understand and promote human 
excellences (virtues) primarily in terms of their effects on individual wellbeing (however 
conceived) is a limited and reductive enterprise. This conception is incomplete. Virtues are 
profoundly relational; they are conceived, practised and sustained in relation to other agents 
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